The campaigns of Prince Eugene of Savoy in 1697 and the Duke of Marlborough in 1704 or two examples in warfare on the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries.

 

By

Balázs Bocz

 

First part

 

(Manuscript, ELTE-BTK, 2014)

 

Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736) and the John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722) were amongst the foremost military leaders, courtiers and – one might say – diplomats of their age. One arguably the greatest leader in the annals of the Imperial Habsburg army, the other of the British Army, they deserve special recognition. Their time was that of great change – at the turn of the 17^th and 18^th centuries – in every field of life, including military affairs. The first standing regiments were born – the English Guards in 1662, the Royal Regiment of Louis XIV in the 1660s, and in those in the Austrian army in 169 -, flintlocks and fixed bayonets introduced, pikes were disappearing, the deep tactical formations for the infantry were changed for platoon firing during the War of the Spanish Succession, and the uniforms of which colours the great armies of Europe were to be known for two centuries were introduced (for example the white in the Austrian army in 1707). The campaign of Prince Eugene in 1697 – the first in which he held the ultimate command of an army – and the joint enterprise with the Duke of Marlborough in 1704 (under the ultimate command of the Englishman) were both sensational in their times, one closing the Great Turkish War, that began with Kara Mustafa’s march on Vienna in 1683, the other beginning the phase of a series of striking triumphs for the Grand Alliance (or the Confederates as they were called then) against Louis XIV in the great war for the Spanish throne. They both, moreover, throw some light on the way in which war was conducted during the period, and are particularly useful case studies.  Logistics, or ‘the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied’[1] played a crucial part in both of them. Strategical initiative and the will to fight a decisive battle inspired them both. They were won by outstanding generals, with a tight grip on their armies. The lessons they offer, are substantial. I shall here go over some general characteristics of warfare at the time, then take a glance at the English and Austrian political and administrative structures, then overview the supplying systems, concluding my survey with the short description of the Zenta and Blenheim campaigns.

The Duke of Wellington[2] wrote early in his carrier, while serving in India: ’the success of military operations depends upon supplies; there is no difficulty in fighting, and in finding the means of beating your enemy either with or without loss; but to gain your objects you must feed.’[3] This was true at the end of the 17^th century as well. The rise of modern state administrations (like the foundation of the Bank of England in 1694, the system of ministries and intendants in France) have modified the system of financial and military administration that existed earlier in the century, but they were still strained to their limits by the overburdening tasks that increasing global commitments and sheer army numbers put on them. While at Rocroi (1643), considered a huge battle by the standards of time, the French and Spanish armies together hardly consisted much more, than 50.000 men, six and a half decades later at Malplaquet (1709) the combined strength of the Confederate and French armies neared 200.000. By the time of the War of the Spanish Succession, France could field 400.000 men at a time, Britain no more, than 150.000, the Dutch 120.000 and the Emperor over 100.000.[4] Added to that growth in numbers, the French, English, the Dutch and Spanish fought extensive wars overseas, in the colonies. The war of the age was likely to be protracted, as huge armies manoeuvred on the field without fighting decisive battles, opting for a series of and exhaustive sieges instead. These were made necessary in particular by the long lines of fortifications in the areas of contests (the Spanish Netherlands in particular was full of forts), which used to protect not only frontiers, but the field armies as well, serving as excellent strong points and storages for provisions, while being able to mount raids on the supply lines of any army passing by them (the concentric lines of Vauban being the most famous of these lines of forts). Battles – when fought – were usually indecisive anyway, as the momentum to destroy the beaten army was lacking and the winner was usually pinned down by fortifications or his own losses. Wars ended in compromise peace (like at Ryswick), providing a pause before the resumption of the conflict. States fought in coalitions, including the two richest, England (and Scotland) and the Dutch Republic. Only the France of Louis XIV could fight on her own. Like modern wars attrition played the crucial part, as state bureaucracies had to provide new recruits during the winter season (to supplement depleted numbers due to high sickness and desertion rates) and the taxes to pay the troops. Rapid campaigns, designed to strike a decisive blow over a short period usually failed, William III’s[5] expedition to England in 1688 being an uncharacteristic example (as he had the support of majority of the English public and political classes).  Supplying an army meant providing the money for payment and the goods, which could be bought with that money. In this central administration had one part, local commanders, their agents and the authorities of towns and villages that they contacted another, the picture being full by adding the various private entrepreneurs, contracted by the first two. 

Fitting the centralized bureaucratized state of Louis XIV and the long tradition of superior Ottoman organization (something that lost its innovativeness and effectiveness mostly by the end of our period) France and the Ottoman Empire started with the best suited administrative system to fulfil the needs of their armed forces. Louvois,[6] the great war minister had magazines established in the fortresses of the Spanish Netherlands, where dried horse fodder was stored over the winter. That allowed the French to take the field in early spring and capture one or two important places, before the normal campaigning season of May-October, when the enemy could respond effectively.[7] In contrast, Austrian or Russian armies were usually in very poor conditions, while the Dutch could rely on their wealth and the organizational traditions of Maurice of Orange. In addition, each country had its own political and social system, that influenced the whole structure of government. The royal bureaucratic absolutism of France was incomparably stronger than the splendid – and very poor – court of Emperor Leopold, whose officials had to fight over every gulden with the estates of the Kronlands that comprised the Habsburg Monarchy (not to mention the estates of the Kingdom of Hungary). In England the Glorious revolution gave assurance to the merchants and nobility that a standing royal army would not be used against them – this was the reason why they voted sums never seen before, sums that founded the campaigns of King William in the Spanish Netherlands. Parliamentarian support meant, that sufficient founds could be collected from the growing English trade to finance a disproportionately huge army and navy, and also that any loan the government was to take was secured by a budget, approved by Parliament, keeping the credit of the government very high during the whole period (even in 1708, the government could borrow at 5% of rates).[8] Absolutism had its benefits, and its defects as well. In England and Scotland, it was Parliament and Privy Council that provided the ground for the infighting of persons and factions, which caused much stir, as much as to prompt Queen Anne and leading statesmen to appeal for unity over and over again. ‘My Inclinations are, to be kind and indulgent to you all. I hope, you will do nothing to endanger the Loss of this Opportunity, which GOD has put into our Hands, of securing ourselves, and all Europe; and that there will be no Contention among you, but who shall most promote the Public Welfare.’ – said the Queen in the House of Lords 24 October, 1704.[9] She had every reason to issue such a warning. Just after Marlborough left for the Hague in the spring of 1704, Lord Nottingham brought matters to a head within the coalition government of Tories and Whigs, led by Godolphin. He demanded a pure Tory government from the Queen and the dismissal of her Whig ministers immediately, threatening to resign if she failed to do so. One of the most influential persons of the majority party issuing an ultimatum necessarily precipitated a political crisis. Just as Marlborough was about to launch his campaign, the home front seemed to have been thrown into confusion. It seemed so only on the surface. Marlborough, Godolphin and their ally, Robert Harley (then Speaker of the Commons) stood ready and the Queen, indignant at the tone of Nottingham summarily dismissed his allies from the government, then accepted his own resignation. The Tory Party split, many MPs weary of a strife during wartime, so they opted to support the new ’National’ ministry of Tories and Whigs. Parliament already voted the provisions for the year, so it went into recess at mid-May waiting to see the war to be won or lost by its reassembling.[10] The worst of the deficiencies of the system were averted by a luckily timed prorogation, for neither the Staaten General in the Dutch Netherlands, nor the English MPs had much trust in a campaign conducted anywhere else but the Spanish Netherlands, the number of disaffected Tory and Whig MPs growing in proportion to the miles of distance between Marlborough and the impregnable French defences along the Scheldt.[11]  The loosely centralized and absolutistic state of Leopold I was in no better shape; there the personal intrigues and the whims of a very mediocre monarch decided crucial issues, their decisions being executed by a notoriously overstretched and corrupt bureaucracy.

The Austrian system was largely unrefined, with ministers taking huge bribes and money constantly lacking.[12] ‘The Austrian administration remained as it was, cumbrous and corrupt.’ – as a scholar put it.[13] It didn’t show much improvement since the time when – so it was rumoured – Ferdinand III was suggested, that a slim horse of his should be appointed to the Hofkämmer,[14] where it would surely get fat. In the meantime, revenues barely reached 12 million guldens, while the Spanish succession war took over 20 million a year.[15]Such was the need that 3 dragoon regiments of Eugene mutinied in 1698 for the lack of pay.[16] In 1703, the year that the chief financer Oppenheimer died and Imperial finance collapsed forthwith, Eugene who finally took over the management of the war as the President of the War Council, put the situation in the most desperate terms: ‘I can assure you’ – he wrote to Guido Starhemberg ‘that were not I here myself and saw everything with my own eyes, no one could make me believe it. If the fate of the Monarchy had hung in the balance and with 50.000 guldens or less it could be saved, there would be no way to stop the menace.’[17] In the previous year he wrote to the Emperor from Italy, where he was in command: ’We are at the end of November and the troops have not yet received their pay for the previous winter let alone the summer. Meanwhile the men are having to go naked.’[18] The matters were not helped by the indecision of the emperor Leopold, nor his attachment to long known, but inept ministers. Oppenheimer’s death on 1 May 1703 caused the collapse of the governments’ credit and no loans could be obtained, when the expenditure (expected to be over 20 million guldens) could be met only up to the half. Oppenheimer’s demise had dealt Austria ‘a blow more fatal than anything France could devise’ – in the words of Salaburg, the President of the Hofkämmer. The looming of disaster finally induced Leopold to action, getting rid of the ‘two asses’ (as Eugene termed the Presidents of the Hofkammer and Hofkriegsrat respectively); the ineffective Salaburg was promptly dismissed, replaced by the talented Gundaker Starhemberg, a friend of Prince Eugene, while the Prince himself was appointed as the new Hofkriegsratpräsident. The changes of 1703 did as much as Höchstädt to save the monarchy: by placing men of talent and energy on the highest posts, the cracking machine of the Monarchy gained some life again. Financial disaster was averted as Starhemberg brough as much regularity into the system as was possible in wartime, he made the first attempt to meet expenditure by indirect taxation, and the first accurate estimates about revenues and expenditures were made. A new financier was found in the Viennese City Bank from 1706 and with the victories on the battlefield and the more efficient handling of government affairs credit began to flow once again. Equally important was the change made possible by the new appointments in the direction of war: Eugene could make plans without more obstacles from the Hofkriegsrat while the Count Wratislaw,[19] an able diplomat and confidant of the King of Rome and Eugene, became the Imperial Minister to the Duke of Marlborough.[20] The Imperial army was still in disarray, for ‘many years have been spent ruining it’ – as Eugene put it in November 1703 -, but his management with scant resources proved to be exceptional, and gave back the army its fighting spirit.  

Finance and supply were the determining factors in waging wars in the later 17^th century. ‘Military economics continued to determine strategy.’ – as a senior historian put it.[21] Supplies – the presence or lack of them – could have decisive results on a campaigns outcome: Frederick William, the Great Elector (1640-88) employed the ’scorched Earth’ tactics to a maximum effect, rendering advancing Swedish armies starve, thereby fighting them to a much more serious effect, than at Fehrbellin (1675). Similarly, William III’s Irish campaign in 1690 was much hindered by the Irish efforts to deny their enemies foraging goods.[22] According to modern field trials a soldier can carry 70 pounds weight at maximum (35 kg).[23] Half of that was bound to be the uniform and arms, and as a soldier had to consume 3 pounds a weight (about 1,5 kg) it ’follows that a marching soldier cannot carry supplies for more than ten or eleven days’.[24] It was a crucial fact, that the food available was perishable before the modern era. Accordingly, it’s transport and availability posed grave problems to any quartermaster. Parched or milled grain was usually supplemented by oil, lard, cheese, fish extracts, wine or bear, or perhaps some salted or dried meat. Even so, any army that left it’s supply lines (hard roads or rivers) for a considerable time, risked starvation as Napoleon’s marshals had to experience in Spain in 1809-13.[25] Another problem was the matter of fodder for the horses, as they were indispensable in keeping an army on the move. The great achievement of Louvois of storing fodder in frontier fortresses provided French armies with a strategical advantage at the outset of every campaigning season. Weather – as in every age, including ours – remained of great significance to the conduct of operations. Prince Eugene’s army in 1697 was desperately in need of supplies from distance, as in the great heat the land dried up and neither water nor grass could be acquired there. Similarly, heavy rain was one of the main reasons for diseases rampant in armies.[26] David Chandler 60.000 men could require 90.000 rations a day and 40.000 horses with it. 1000 carts were needed in summer, 500 in winter. Fodder was of special importance, a commander having to feed his horses. That meant that every 4th day the cavalry had to ride out and engage in the manual cutting down & transporting of grain. That took almost the whole of the cavalry, thus rendering an army vulnerable to an enemy, who had finished his own foraging & were ready to engage. The French were the most adept in this There was a ’petite guerre’, a small war of ’courses’ going on, with foraging parties engaging one another, just as on the seas the big battles of fleets composed of ships of the line were supplemented by the ‘small war’ of privateers.

---

Amíg az oldal tulajdonosa nem helyez el itt tartalmat, addig a mai napi leglátogatottabb oldalak listája jelenik meg!

 

Oldal: Bocz Balázs: Eugene and Marlborough (First part)
VIII. Henrik (1509-1547) angol király magyar szövetségesei - © 2008 - 2024 - viiihenrik.hupont.hu

Az ingyenes honlapkészítés azt jelenti, hogy Ön készíti el a honlapját! Ingyen adjunk: Ingyen Honlap!

ÁSZF | Adatvédelmi Nyilatkozat